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Morgan: Toward Abandoning Organized Professionalism

TOWARD ABANDONING ORGANIZED
PROFESSIONALISM
Thomas D. Morgan*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The perceived decline in lawyer "professionalism" generates
anguished cries. "Has our profession abandoned principle for profit,
professionalism for commercialism?," the American Bar Association
("ABA") Commission on Professionalism asked in 1986.' While the
"answer cannot be a simple yes or no," readers were told, "the practices
of some lawyers cry out for correction." 2
Lawyer Peter Megargee Brown has been less restrained, decrying a
profession of "rascals" engaged in "widespread greed, hype, and selfdealing,"3 while lawyer Sol Linowitz writes bitterly of his "betrayed
profession." Even Yale Law School Dean Anthony Kronman has joined
the chorus, describing law as a profession that "now stands in danger of
losing its soul."5
One must respect the chagrin and sadness that underlies these
accounts of professional decline, although as Deborah Rhode wryly
notes, "[1]awyers [seem to] belong to a profession permanently in
* Oppenheim Professor of Antitrust & Trade Regulation Law, The George Washington
University Law School. Antonella Karlin provided helpful research assistance in preparation of this
Article.
"
1. COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, ABA, ....IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:" A
BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 1 (1986), reprintedin 112 F.R.D.

243 (1987).
2. IL
3. PETER MEGARGEE BROWN, RASCALS: THE SELLING OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 5 (1989).
The author attributes his use of the word "rascals" to Chief Justice Warren Burger, whose concerns
about lawyer conduct had led to creation of the American Bar Association ("ABA") Commission on
Professionalism. See id. at 9.
4. SOL M. LINovrrz wrrH MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT
THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994).
5. ANTHONY T. KRoNMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 1 (1993).
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decline."6 In this Article, however, I suggest that lawyers are unlikely to
fix what is genuinely wrong with the legal profession until we abandon
the quest for what I call today's "organized professionalism."7
A.

The Commonsense Meaning of Professionalism

Opposing professionalism will be an uphill battle. Lawyers take
pride in professional status." If pride were all that were at stake,
challenging the label would not be worth the effort, but much more is
involved.
At the outset of any discussion of professionals and
professionalism, of course, one has to acknowledge that those terms are
used in widely different ways. For many generations, medicine, law,
theology, and teaching were considered to be the only "learned
professions." 9 Now, however, we speak of professional musicians,
professional athletes, and even professional dog walkers.'Y
Given this reality, sociologist Eliot Freidson describes the
"commonsense idea of professionalism" as a "social label applied to a
limited number of occupations considered to be in some way superior to
ordinary occupations."" Indicators of the superiority include "relatively
high prestige, extended, specialized training, and being paid for one's
6. DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION
1 (2000). Lots of examples support Professor Rhode's observation, for example, early in the last
century, one prominent law school dean complained that "in the dominant attitude, the Law is no
more than a trade, an occupation, a business." John H. Wigmore, Introductionto ORRIN N. CARTER,
ETHICS OFTHE LEGAL PROFESSION, at xxi, xxi (1915).
7. The ABA Section of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar has been a leader in
professionalism efforts, first creating a Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession and then its
own Professionalism Committee. See generally SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSION TO THE
BAR TASK FORCE ON LAW SCH. AND THE PROFESSION, ABA, NARROWING THE GAP, LEGAL
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT: AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (1992)
[hereinafter MACCRATE COMM'N]; SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR
PROFESSIONALISM COMM., ABA, TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM (1996) [hereinafter
TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM]. The Standing Committee on Professionalism of the
ABA Center for Professional Responsibility coordinates efforts for the American Bar Association as
a whole. See generally WORKING GROUP ON LAWYER CONDUCT AND PROFESSIONALISM, ABA,
A NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON LAWYER CONDUCT AND PROFESSIONALISM (1999).
8. See CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, A NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON LAWYER CONDUCT
AND PROFESSIONALISM 10 (1999).
9. ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIvlES 5 (1953).

10. See, e.g., James A. Woehlke, Lifelong Learning:Key to a ProfessionalFuture,TRUSTED
PROF., Jan. 1999 (citing the emergence of "newer learned professions"), at
http://www.nysscpa.org/trustedprof/0199/article36.htm (last visited Apr. 9,2002).
11. Eliot Freidson, Professionalismas Model and Ideology, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LA\VYERS'
PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 215, 216 (Robert L. Nelson
et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES].
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work."' 2 The objective measure of success in this sense of
professionalism, in turn, is whether actual performance by the
professional of whatever kind measures up to the level that the public
has been led to expect. 3
Even I agree that lawyers should strive to be "professionals" in this
commonsense use of the term, and estimates of current improvement or
decline in such professionalism tend to be mixed. For example, today's
best lawyers are probably smarter, know more law, and are harder
working than at almost any time in history. Their role in public
leadership and their efforts to see that legal service is widely available to
all citizens, however, have likely declined.' 4 Use of at least this kind of
impressionistic data to evaluate this sense of lawyer professionalism is
probably inevitable, but it will not be the focus of this Article.' 5
Neither will this Article criticize "professionalism" as it is used to
describe "civility," or what I call "acting like a responsible grown-up."
Such civility does not require less than fully committed representation of
a client but it does requires avoiding ad hominem attacks on opposing
parties and counsel and showing respect for public officers and tribunal
rules.' 6 There is nothing about my argument against organized
professionalism that requires any less.
II. THE CONCEPT OF ORGANIZED PROFESSIONALISM
What I am calling "organized professionalism" is based on the
more analytic view taken by sociologists such as Freidson who describe
professionals as "members of a specialized occupation [that] control
their own work.' 7 In order to achieve such control, such a profession
must be "organized as an identifiable group."'" Organization is required
so that the members can regulate "recruitment and training [and]

12. Id.
13. See id. at 217.
14. See generally KRONMAN, supra note 5; RHODE, supranote 6.
15. For an excellent discussion of this more limited view of professionalism, see Timothy P.
Terrell & James H. Wildman, Rethinking "Professionalism",41 EMORY L.J. 403, 420-21 (1992),
and commentary thereon in the same issue of the Emory Law Journal.
16. For good examples of this kind of concern about professionalism, see CONFERENCE OF
CHIEF JUSTICES, supra note 8, at vii-viii; TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM, supra
note 7, passim (collecting reports on many professionalism programs). See also Allen K. Harris, The
Professionalism Crisis-The 'z' Words and Other Rambo Tactics: The Conference of Chief
Justices' Solution, PROF. LAW, winter 2001, at 1, 1.
17. Freidson, supranote 11, at 219 (emphasis omitted).
18. Id. at 220.
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entrance into the labor market," and establish "the procedures and
criteria by which performance is organized and evaluated at work."' 9
Anyone with economic training, of course, recognizes those classic
"professional" traits as also the characteristics of a cartel. 20 To avoid
antitrust liability and to insulate its members against competition
attracted by the higher fees a cartel can charge, a profession must seek
government protection of a specially-defined scope of work. 2' To get
such protection, Freidson suggests, the public "must be persuaded that
the body of knowledge and skill ascribed to the occupation is of such a
special character to warrant privilege."22 That conclusion, in turn, will be
based on other claims such as: "the functional importance of the body of
knowledge and skill," "its intrinsic cultural importance," "its unusually
complex and esoteric character," the "serious consequences [that] can
result from poor work," and the fact that the "occupation as a corporate
body is able to control itself without abusing its privilege" because
of
23
the "good character" as well as the competence of its members.
Application of those principles to the legal profession's traditional
self-description is obvious and not accidental. Jerold Auerbach, Richard
Abel, and others 24 have traced the efforts of American lawyers since at
least the eighteenth century to create the sense that they are entitled to be
such an organized, self-regulating group. I will not repeat the history
here, although one must at least mention de Tocqueville's oft-quoted
description of lawyers as America's "aristocrats":
The special knowledge that lawyers acquire in studying the law
assures them a separate rank in society; they form a sort of privileged
class among [persons of] intelligence. Each day they find the idea of
this superiority in the exercise of their profession; they are masters of a

19. Id.
20. See, e.g., MILTON FREEDMAN, CAPITALISM & FREEDOM 137-60 (1962); RICHARD A.
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 33 (1995). "The history of the legal profession is to a great extent, and
despite noisy and incessant protestation and apologetics, the history of efforts by all branches of the
profession, including the professoriat and the judiciary, to secure a lustrous place in the financial
and social-status sun." Id.
21. See, e.g., Thomas D. Morgan, The Impact of Antitrust Law on the Legal Profession, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 415, 425 (1998).
22. Freidson, supra note 11, at 220.
23. Id. at 220-21.
24. See generally RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989); JEROLD S. AUERBACH,
UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976); see also Thomas

D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of ProfessionalResponsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1977).
Less critical accounts may be found in ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IN AMERICA (2 vols. 1965), and CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
BAR (1966).
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necessary science, knowledge of which is not widespread; they serve
as arbiters between citizens, and the habit of directing the blind
passions of the litigants toward a goal gives them a certain scorn for
the judgment of the crowd. Add to this that they naturally form a body.
It is not that they agree among themselves ... but community of
studies and unity of methods bind their minds to one another as interest
could unite their wills.25

Lawyers quote less often what de Tocqueville says in the
immediately following passage, but it helps to illustrate why the
relationship between lawyers and the public has been uneasy:
Hidden at the bottom of the souls of lawyers one therefore finds a
part of the tastes and habits of aristocracy. They have its instinctive
penchant for order, its natural love of forms; they conceive its great
disgust for the actions of the multitude and secretly scorn the
government of the people.26

Indeed, in the years after de Tocqueville's visit, lawyers as a group
lost much of their luster in the public mind. Educational standards to
become a lawyer became low or nonexistent; if Abraham Lincoln could
become a celebrated lawyer after studying by the fireside, so could
anyone else.27 The effort to portray lawyers as a separate and superior
class faded, arguably only to be reborn with the creation of local bar
associations after the Civil War and the ABA in 1878.8

25. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 252 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba
Winthrop trans. & eds., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835) (alteration in original).
26. Id.
27. One can argue that the effort to preserve lawyers' historic sense of themselves as leaders
of the republic underlies the two best nineteenth century accounts of lawyers' ethics. These were
DAviD HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY (Arno Press 1972) (1836), and GEORGE
SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1907).
28. The developments are chronicled in detail in POUND, supra note 9. The motivating ideal,
as articulated by Dean Wigmore in 1915, sounds as if it could have been written today:
The law as a pursuit is not a trade. It is a profession. It ought to signify for its
followers a mental and moral setting apart from the multitude,--a priesthood of Justice.
How the present attitude has come about is easy to see.... In a country where all
men started even and each man had to earn his living,--where tradition and privilege
were cast aside .... the law took its place with other livelihoods; and its gainful aspect
became emphasized. And then ... came the commercial expansion following the Civil
War, and the lawyer was more and more drawn into the intimate relations as adviser of
the business man. And now, in the large cities, the commercial standards have spread to
the Law, and the profession has been merged into the trade.
Nevertheless, that is all an error. That is, the inherent nature of things demands
always that the law shall be a profession.
Wigmore, supranote 6, at xxi-xxii.
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But even efforts in the first fifty years or so of the ABA's existence
were relatively modest. In the quarter-century from 1878-1902, for
example, the ABA was a group of less than 2000 lawyers who met
informally each summer, by invitation only, at Saratoga Springs, New
York.29 Its purposes were said to be: "(1) To advance the science of
jurisprudence; (2) To promote the administration of justice; (3) To
promote uniformity of legislation throughout the union; (4) To uphold
the honor of the profession; and (5) To encourage cordial intercourse
among the members of the American Bar."30
After the turn of the century, the ABA tried to expand its influence.
It held its meetings around the country, and grew from 1718 members to
just over 29,000 by 1936.3' In 1908, early in this expansion period, the
ABA adopted its first Canons of Professional Ethics that served as a
model for subsequent state lawyer conduct standards. 32 The ABA's role
in law school accreditation began in 1923. 33
But it was not until 1936 that the ABA organized itself into the
broad national organization that we know today. ' The Great Depression
29. Lawyers had to be selected by state bar organizations to attend the meetings of the new
national organization. See GERALD CARSON, A GOOD DAY AT SARATOGA 3-6 (1978); EDSON R.
SUNDERLAND, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND ITS WORK 3-14 (1953).
30. SUNDERLAND, supra note 29, at 17. The ABA created standing committees and later
sections through which to work between annual meetings; the first of these was the Committee
(later the Section) on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar. See id. at 28. In 1892, it created an
auxiliary organization, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, see id. at 50, and in 1900, the
Association of American Law Schools, as a home for the nation's "reputable law schools." Id at 47.
31. See ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & CHARLES 0. PORTER, THE AMERICAN LAWYER: A
SUMMARY OF THE SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 292-99 (1954). A new ABA purpose,
promotion of "uniformity of judicial decision" was added in 1919, see SUNDERLAND, supra note 29,
at 17, and when the American Law Institute was created in 1923, the ABA urged state consideration
of its work. See id. at 91.
32. Commentators have observed that the Canons give lawyers a more public-interested role
than do the Model Rules. See, e.g., Susan D. Carle, Lawyers' Duty to Do Justice:A New Look at the
History of the 1908 Canons,24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 1 (1999); Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering
the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 241-42 (1992).
What those analyses tend to downplay is that at the time it promulgated the Canons, the ABA
probably represented less than two percent of the American bar. CompareABEL, supra note 24, at
280 (noting that in 1900, the number of lawyers was 109,140), with SUNDERLAND, supra note 29, at
40 (noting that in 1903, the ABA had 1718 members). They were not written as representative of
then-current practice or with an expectation of general enforcement. See CARTER, supra note 6, at
27-29. For a helpful account of issues arising under the Canons, see generally AM. BAR FOUND. &
ABA, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS WITH THE CANONS OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS ANNOTATED AND CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS ANNOTATED (1967 ed.).

33. See SUNDERLAND, supra note 29, at 91. For a less flattering account of the purposes and
effects of ABA influence during this period, see, for example, AUERBACH, supra note 24, and
ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S,
at 20-34 (1983).
34. See SUNDERLAND, supra note 29, at 173.
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was in its darkest days and President Roosevelt had created the New
Deal with which many lawyers were uncomfortable. Just two years
earlier, then-Justice Stone had said:
We meet at a time when, as never before in the history of the
country, our most cherished ideals and traditions are being subject to
searching criticism....
... It is true, if tradition and history are guides, that we may rightly
look to the Bar for leadership in the preservation and development of
American institutions. Specially trained in the field of law and
government, invested with the unique privileges of his office,
experienced in the world of affairs, and versed in the problems of
business organization and administration, to whom, if not to the
lawyer, may we look for guidance in solving the problems of a sorely
stricken social order? 5
The ABA saw itself as providing that guidance in the nation's
darkest hours. Governing authority in the ABA was shifted from an
Assembly of ABA members to a new House of Delegates representing
not only individual members, but also state bar associations and other
significant professional groups. 6 Among the first proposals that the
"new" ABA then aggressively opposed was President Roosevelt's court
packing plan.37

35. Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, Address at the Dedication of the Law
Quadrangle, University of Michigan (June 15, 1934), in 48 HARv. L. REV. 1, 2 (1934). Justice
Stone continued:
Throughout the history of Anglo-American civilization, the professional groups
have been among the most significant of those non-governmental agencies which
promote the public welfare. Although in smaller measure... their function has been not
unlike that of the medieval guilds.... while it has not inherited the completely
independent status of the English bar, to no other group in this country has the state
granted comparable privileges or permitted so much autonomy. No other is so closely
related to the state, and no other has traditionally exerted so powerful an influence on
public opinion and on public policy.
d at 4-5.
36. See SuNDERLAND, supra note 29, at 173-76. Among the other groups represented in the
House of Delegates were the American Law Institute and the American Judicature Society. See id
The meeting at which these changes were adopted is reported in great detail in Current Events, 22
A.B.A. J. 587,660 (1936).
37. See, e.g., Sylvester C. Smith, Jr., The Present Situation in the Fightto Save the Court, 23
A.B.A. J. 401, 402 (1937); Frederick H. Stinchfield, The Supreme Court Issue, 23 A.B.A. J. 233,
236 (1937). The same volume of the ABA Journalcontains a discussion by a member of the House
of Delegates about the need to increase lawyer income by reducing the number of new lawyers. See
John Kirkland Clark, Limitation of Admission to the Bar, 23 A.B.A. J. 48, 49-50 (1937). For an
account of other causes in which the ABA got involved, see Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crises or
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III. THE SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
During World War II, professional reform was a relatively low
priority issue. Thus, the key development in the effort to organize
lawyers into a coordinated profession seems to have been the ABA's
now almost-forgotten Survey of the Legal Profession ("Survey"). 5 The
Survey was conceived as the war was coming to a end.39 Thousands of
lawyers had gone into military service, leaving their families and closing
their offices. ° Many questioned what the lawyer-soldiers would find
when they came home.4 What would be the nature of the substantive
law and what would be the circumstances of their practice?
Originally proposed by the ABA Section of Legal Education and
Admission to the Bar, the Survey examined those questions by inquiring
into the "much wider problem of finding out what lawyers actually do in
present-day society and whether they are adequately meeting the needs
of the public.' ' 2 Lawyers recruited to participate in the Survey were a
who's who of the American Bar. The project's first Director was Dean
Arthur T. Vanderbilt of New York University.43 When Dean Vanderbilt
became Chief Justice of New Jersey, he was succeeded by Boston
lawyer Reginald Heber Smith, long revered as the guardian of the legal
aid movement in the United States. 44
Results of the Survey have been published in over 150 books and
articles, most by well-known authors. For example, Harvard's Dean
Roscoe Pound wrote the book on the history of lawyers and their bar
associations.46 Chief Judge Orie Phillips of the Tenth Circuit wrote the
volume on the extent of lawyer compliance with the Canons of Ethics.4 7
Dean and former American Association of Law Schools president Albert

One: The Concept of Legal Professionalism, 1925-1960, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS'
PRACTICES, supra note 11, at 144.
38. See BLAUSTEIN & PORTER, supra note 31, at 2.
39. See id.
40. Reginald Heber Smith, Survey of the Legal Profession: Its Scope, Methods and
Objectives, in POUND, supra note 9, at v, vii.
41. See id.
42. Id. Although not an "official" Survey publication, the best collection of Survey findings is
BLAUSTEIN & PORTER, supranote 31.
43. See id. at xi.
44. See id. at xii.
45. These works include ALBERT J. HARNO, LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES
(1953), ORIE L. PHILLIPS & PHILBRICK MCCOY, CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS (1952), and
POUND, supra note 9.
46. See generally POUND, supra note 9.
47. See generally PHILLIPS & MCCOY, supra note 45.
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J. Harno of Illinois wrote a book on legal education,4 s and Professors
Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,49 Maynard Pirsig, ° and Elliott Cheatham5 ' all
conducted important studies for the Survey.
In part, the Survey reflected a concern about the economic health of
the postwar legal profession. As one author candidly described the
problem:
This large number of students in the law schools presents a difficult
problem of placing the young law graduates after they are admitted to
practice and is symptomatic of the possible serious overcrowding of
the bar in the future. The problem is not likely to become lessened so
long as government aid is available to veterans. As one law dean has
put it, the question some day will arise as to whether the veteran will
52
go on relief or enroll in a law school .
Another dimension of the Survey, however, was its renewal of the
vision of lawyers as the principal custodians of American law and the
American way of life.53 Reginald Heber Smith's introduction to Dean
role: 5
Pound's volume asserts this centrality of the lawyer's
Under a government of laws the lives, the fortunes, and the freedom
of the people are wholly dependent upon the enforcement of their
constitutional rights by an independent judiciary and by an
independent bar.
The legal profession is a public profession. Lawyers are public
servants. They are the stewards of all the legal rights and obligations of
all the citizens."
At first reading, that sentiment sounds noble and almost selfdeprecating. In context, however, it can be seen to be another assertion
that the content as well as the administration of the law is the province
of lawyers. Dean Pound explained:
48. See generally HARNO, supranote 45.
49. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Changes in the Law During Forty Years, Address to the
Rochester Bar Association (June 6, 1950), in 32 B.U. L. REv. 46 (1952) (describing differences in
practice faced by modem lawyers as a result of creation of the workers' compensation system and
the rise of administrative agencies).
50. See generally Maynard E. Pirsig, A Survey of Judicial Councils, Judicial Conferences,
and AdministrativeDirectors,47 BRIEF 181 (1952).
51. See generally Elliott E. Cheatham, The Inculcation of Professional Standards and the
Functionsof the Lawyer, 21 TENN. L. REV. 812 (1951).
52. Homer D. Crotty, Who Shall Be Called to the Bar?, 20 B. EXAMINER 173, 175 (1951).
53. See Smith, supra note 40, at vii.
54. See id.
55. Id. (emphasis added).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 14
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:947

[T]he word law has two meanings. One is ... the legal order: The
regime of adjusting relations and ordering conduct by the systematic
application of the force of a politically organized society. The other
is... the body of authoritative models or patterns of decision which,
because they are applied by the courts in decision of controversies,
serve as guides of conduct to the conscientious citizen, as threats to the
wrongdoer, as grounds of determination to the magistrate, and as bases
of prediction to the counsellor.... From antiquity it has been found
that law in the first sense can only be maintained by law in the second
56
sense and that law in the second sense requires lawyers.

Under our polity many political questions are as well legal and
many legal questions are also political. Thus our constitutional polity is
so legal as to be dependent upon lawyers for interpretation, application
against official absolutism and legislative
and maintenance
57
encroachment.
...

A dangerous lack of lawyer professionalism, Pound thought,
threatened lawyers' ability to meet this public obligation." In language
that, taken out of context, became central to the later Report of the ABA
Commission on Professionalism, he reflected on a view of lawyers that
he feared might be repeated in the postwar period:
Instead of a profession, an organized body of men pursuing a
learned art in the spirit of a public service, the era of emergent
democracy, in its leveling zeal, and the succeeding era of hegemony of
the frontier, in its faith in the ability of any man to do anything and its
zeal for unrestrained individual freedom, sought to substitute for the
profession pursuing a learned art, an uneducated, untrained trade
pursuing a money-making calling in the spirit of a business. 9

56. POUND, supra note 9, at xxiii.
57. Id. at xxvi (emphasis added).
58. See id. at xxvii.
59. Id. Later, Dean Pound said:
Learning is one of the things which sets off a profession from a calling or vocation or
occupation. Professions are learned not only from the nature of the art professed but
historically have a cultural, an ideal, side which furthers the exercise of that art.
Problems of human relations in society, problems of disease, problems of the upright life
guided by religion are to be dealt with by the resources of cultivated intelligence by
lawyer, physician, and clergyman. To carry on their tasks most effectively they must be
more than resourceful craftsmen. They must be learned men.
Id. at9.
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The authors of a summary volume about the Survey's findings
explained why Pound had focused so specifically on organized bar
associations as the salvation of the profession.' "It is only through
organization, Pound declares, that the spirit of public service can be
developed and maintained and crucial types of public service be
rendered effectively."'" Pound himself said:
It is the bar association, not the individual lawyer, that can maintain
high educational standards insuring a learned profession, that can
maintain high standards of character as a prerequisite of admission to
practice, that can formulate and maintain high standards of ethical
conduct in relations both with clients and with courts. The public has a
deep interest in having a well-organized bar as part of the machinery of
administering justice in a complex social and economic order.62
IV. WHY ISTHIS IMPORTANT TODAY?
Although now almost forgotten, the Survey was the mainspring for
many of the efforts by the ABA and other bar associations to organize
the legal profession during the 1950s and 1960s, 6' a period now dubbed
the "golden age" of the American bar.6 One can, of course, question that
characterization. The profession lacked diversity,6 bar admission was

60. See BLAUSTEIN & PORTER, supra note 31, at 283-84.
61. Id. An official summary of Survey findings was never published, but Blaustein and Porter
had been assistants to Reginald Heber Smith and published this "unofficial" summary with his
approval. See id.
62. POUND, supranote 9, at 11. In an Epilogue to his book, Dean Pound expressed a fear that
the growth of large law firms would make lawyers seek trade union representation. See id. at 354.
He called for lawyers "bred to a professional tradition," and aspired to have the legal profession be a
group of public-spirited citizens who would stand against the growth of big government. See id.
at 353-62.
63. The ABA's role in the selection of federal judges, for example, begun in 1952, was
inherent in the view that lawyers were responsible for the quality of the law and lawgivers. See
Roberta Cooper Ramo & N. Lee Cooper, The American Bar Association's Integral Role in the
Federal Judicial Selection Process: Excerpted Testimony of Roberta Cooper Ramo and N. Lee
CooperBefore the JudiciaryCommittee of the United States Senate, May 21, 1996, 12 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 93, 97 n.17 (1996).
64. See MARc GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 10 (1991). The characterization is affirmed in MARY
ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS

TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 20 (1994).
65. See BARBARA A. CURRAN ET AL., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: A STATISTICAL
PROFILE OF THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1980S 10 tbl.I.3.1 (1985). From 1950 to 1970, the

proportion of women lawyers ranged between 2.5% and 2.8%. See id.The number of minority
lawyers does not even seem to have been recorded before about 1970. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note
24, at 288. Even critics of the current state of the bar recognize that calls for the good old days must
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denied on political grounds, 66 accessible programs of group legal
services were largely outlawed, 67 and lawyers in many states were
required to charge at least specified minimum fees."' Indeed, one can
describe most Supreme Court cases about the legal profession since the
mid-1950s as invalidating ethical standards spawned by the Survey.69
The legal profession has radically changed since the Survey was
undertaken, of course, 70 but the sense of a once "golden age" remains,
perhaps because the 1950s and 1960s were a time when lawyers' lives
were relatively stable. 7' An associate who worked hard could expect
mentoring from senior lawyers, would very likely become a partner, and
would ultimately retire from the firm in which he began his practice.
Along the way, he would have earned an above-average income, worked
on a variety of cases, and been a leader in community organizations.73
That perception of a lawyer's world is virtually unrecognizable in
many quarters today. Lawyers increasingly "eat what they kill," i.e., get
paid based on cases they bring to the firm more than for the professional
work they do on those cases]4 Partnership is difficult to attain, 75 and
even once received, it is often little valued as lawyers abandon one firm

not ignore the positive effects of having greater diversity and opportunity in the profession. See
LINOWITZ, supra note 4, at 5-6.
66. See, e.g., In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 83-84 (1961).
67. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(D) (1983).
68. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773,776 (1975).
69. See, e.g., id. at 793 (holding that lawyer minimum fee schedules violate federal antitrust
law); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (holding that a state may not prohibit
unions referring members to lawyers); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957)
(holding that the state may not deny bar admission based on past Communist Party membership).
70. The 221,000 lawyers in 1950, for example, doubled to 442,000 in 1980, and redoubled to
more than one million today. See CURRAN ET AL., supra note 65, at 4 tbl.I.l.1. Only about 5,500
lawyers were women in 1950, compared to over 200,000 today. See id. The number of minority
lawyers was not even counted in 1950 and is sketchy and unreliable even today. See SPECIAL
COMM. ON THE LAW GOVERNING FIRM STRUCTURE AND OPERATION, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N,

PRESERVING THE CORE VALUES OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION: THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY
PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 12 (2000) [hereinafter N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N]; see
also ABEL, supranote 24, at 288 tbl.30.
71. See, e.g., GLENDON, supranote 64, at 20.
72. See, e.g., LINOWITZ, supra note 4, at 29-30.
73. The use of the masculine form in this account reflects the overwhelming proportion of
male lawyers during this period. This story is told especially well in LINOWTZ, supra note 4, and
GLENDON, supra note 64.
74. See LINOWrrZ, supranote 4, at 32.
75. The literature on the competition for partnership includes GALANTER & PALAY, supra
note 64. The analysis there is helpfully qualified in David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Galati,
Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the
Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581 (1998) (discussing the
competition in law firms for partnership positions).
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for another offering more glamorous promises. 6 Lawyers compete, not
for places in heaven, but to achieve a high firm ranking in the American
Lawyer profits-per-equity-partner tables.7
What I observe-and in this Article challenge-is an effort to deal
with the new reality by turning back toward the cartel-like attitudes of
the 1950s. Nowhere is this regressive approach easier to see than in the
ABA's response to the phenomenon of multidisciplinary practice.
Business clients today face a world more complex and competitive
than almost any could have imagined even a few years ago. 78 Local
production and local markets in many industries are now only a
memory.79 The new reality involves low-cost worldwide instant
communication, tariff protection that is low or nonexistent, workers
producing goods, or parts of goods, in all corners of the world at low
prices, and technological changes that render investments obsolete long
before they have yielded the return that justified making them in the first
place.
Realities such as these have driven many lawyers' business clients
to consulting firms for global advice. 80 Often, but not necessarily, such
consulting organizations are adjuncts of accounting firms operating
worldwide.8' In the work of such consulting firms, domestic American
legal issues are part-but typically only a part--of any future course of
action for a client that the consultant will recommend. n As part of their
internal staffing, such firms have hired lawyers to participate in their
work of formulating business plans, drafting possible contract
documents, and making regulatory filings. 3
In spite of a report from its own Commission that proposed limited
recognition of such organizations as providers of services with which

76. See LNowrrz, supranote 4, at 32.
77. See TheAmLaw 100, AM. LAW., July 2001, at 131, 131.
78. See LINowrrz, supranote 4, at 100-01.
79. See Morgan, supra note 21, at 416.
80. See Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of Purchasing
Legal Servicesfrom Lawyers in a MultidisciplinaryPartnership,13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 217, 222
(2000); John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the American
Legal Profession:A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in the TwentyFirstCentury, 69 FORDHAm L. REv. 83, 105 (2000).
81. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 80, at 84.
82. See id. at 105.
83. There is a large literature on multidisciplinary practice. See generallyDaly, supra note 80;
Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 80; Lawrence J. Fox, Accountants, the Hawks of the
ProfessionalWorld: They Foul Our Nest and Theirs Too, Plus OtherRuminations on the Issue of
MDPs, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1097 (2000).
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lawyers might cooperate, 84 the response of the ABA was swift and
unyielding. Current ethical rules governing most American lawyers
forbid a lawyer's forming "a partnership with a nonlawyer." That rule
has been understood, for example, to forbid a lawyer's working with an
organization controlled by nonlawyers if that organization gives legal
advice to its clients.86 The ABA voted down an amendment to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct that would have facilitated lawyer
cooperation with all such organizations, including social service
agencies that wanted to provide legal services as part of a
comprehensive package of services to the poor. 7
A.

The FragileCharacterof Cartels

One can criticize on several grounds the ABA's reaction to the
possibility that clients might seek legal advice from lawyers working in
organizations other than law firms. My focus here, however, is on the
House of Delegates' assumption that they can get away with trying to
prohibit such advice and the lpng-term costs of trying to do so.
Cartels in a wide variety of industries have long tried to enforce
restrictions on terms of dealing with their clients.u Sometimes, the

84. See generally COMM'N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, ABA, REPORT TO THE HOUSE
OF DELEGATES (1999).
85. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 5.4 (2001) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
86. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. James, 478 So. 2d 27, 28 (Fla. 1985) (per curiam) (bill collection
company); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 633 (1992) (debt consolidation
company).
87. Ultimate defeat of the proposals came in August 2000 when the ABA House of Delegates
adopted a proposal to develop rules making cooperation even more difficult. For an excellent
discussion of the issues surrounding multidisciplinary partnerships, see, for example, Daly, supra
note 80; Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 80; Laurel S. Terry, A Primer on MDPS: Should the
"No" Rule Become a New Rule?, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 869 (1999).
Another example of the divergence between the results of ABA rule making and the
ethical judgments of others can be seen in the ABA House of Delegates' reaction in August 2001 to
a proposal to permit lawyer disclosures to help prevent the consequences of a financial fraud
committed by the lawyer's client and in which the lawyer's services were used. See MODEL RULES,
supra note 85, R. 1.6. In the face of many state provisions permitting or requiring such disclosures,
the ABA maintained its prohibition. See id. On an earlier debate about such issues, see generally
Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677 (1989); cf.Ted Schneyer, Policymaking and the Perils of
Professionalism: The ABA's Ancillary Business Debate as a Case Study, 35 ARIZ. L. REv. 363
(1993).
88. See, e.g., Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 458-59 (1940) (holding
gasoline monopoly to be unlawful based on its customer restrictions and manufacturing licensing
limitations); see also Patrick John McGinley, Comment, Beyond Health Care Reform:
Reconsidering Certificate of Need Laws in a "Managed Competition" System, 23 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 141, 146 (1995) (referring to the cartels in health planning agencies).
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restrictions succeed for a while. Ultimately, however, such restrictions
tend to be overcome, and it is likely to be the clients and their other
service providers-not the lawyers-who prevail. 9
First, lawyers' ethical restrictions can be effective only insofar as
they can bar others from delivering particular services deemed to be
legal services. Traditionally, bar associations have had unauthorized
practice of law committees whose responsibility has been to seek
injunctions against such services." Increasingly, however, the
effectiveness of such efforts has been minimal, in part because such
cases are expensive to bring, particularly against well-financed
adversaries. 9' When the State Bar of Texas tried to enjoin provision of
legal services by accounting firm Arthur Andersen, for example, the
complaint was dismissed out of hand.9
Indeed, legislatures have effectively overruled efforts by lawyers to
stake out particular areas of practice as their own.93 When Texas tried to
enjoin sale of a CD-ROM called Quicken Family Lawyer, for example,
legislation was adopted within a month declaring such sales to be legal.'
Arizona even amended its constitution to assure real estate brokers the
right to fill in the blanks on a real estate sales contract. 95
Second, legal ethics restrictions affect only people who are licensed
lawyers. 9 One way lawyers can avoid discipline for cooperating with
multidisciplinary organizations is to disbar themselves voluntarily, i.e.,
to resign from the bar in jurisdictions in which they are licensed. 97 Such
former lawyers bring all their professional skills to a project; they simply
avoid exposure to professional discipline.
Third, if U.S. lawyers bar consulting firms from delivering legal
services in the United States, clients can get the services from firms

89. See George B. Shepherd & William G. Shepherd, Scholarly Restraints? ABA
Accreditation and Legal Education, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 2091,2202-03 (1998).
90. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 cmt. b (1998)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT, LAWYERS].
91. See, e.g., Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA), 14 Current Reports 365 (1998); id.
at 542,544.
92. See id.
93. See, e.g., H.R. 1507, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999) (providing that the practice of law
did not include the sale and distribution of computer software if the products state clearly and
conspicuously that the products are not a substitute for the advice of an attorney).
94. See Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d 956, 956 (5th
Cir. 1999) (vacating injunction based on the new statute).
95. See ARIz. CONST. art. 26, § 1.
96. See MODEL RULES, supranote 85, pmbl. (discussing how the rules govern the conduct of
lavqers); Terry, supranote 87, at 896-97.
97. See Terry, supra note 87, at 896-97.
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operating out of Canada or Europe." The ABA seems to think it is still
operating in a world in 'which communication and travel are difficult.
Clients know better, and so do the multidisciplinary practice firms.
B. The ConcernAbout Protectionof Lawyers' "Core Values"
Perhaps out of a realization that the ABA position cannot long
survive simply as a matter of power, defenses have been advanced that
the position is required as a matter of policy. 99 The defenses are derived
from the sense of unique lawyer roles and standards that motivated the
ABA in the 1930s and later in the Survey of the Legal Profession.'ro
This time the arguments were contained in a report of the New
York State Bar Association that identified seven "core values" said to be
central to lawyers' conduct but not to the conduct of nonlawyers whom
clients might consult.' ° ' The values were said to be (1) preserving
confidentiality, (2) avoiding conflicts of interest, (3) using independent
judgment on the client's behalf, (4) providing competent service,
(5) advocating with commitment, (6) assuring broad access to justice,
and (7) preserving the rule of law in society.'02
These seven values are indeed both implicit in lawyer traditions and
important to clients and the larger society. If sensitivity to such values
were unique to lawyers, the case for preserving a lawyer monopoly in
the name of professionalism might be strong. However, the case does
not survive even cursory analysis.
Lawyers have no unique claim to these core values. The first four
relate to the relationship between lawyer and client.' 3 The same values
are part of the ideals of most professions and they are enforced as
principles governing all agents, of whom lawyers are simply a subclass."°'

98. See Daly, supra note 80, at 219, 220 n.5.
99. These defenses were advanced in a report of the New York Bar Association. See infra
notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
100. See discussion supra Part III.
101. See N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N, supra note 70, at 310-22. The chair of the Committee was
Robert MacCrate, former ABA President and long-time bar leader.
102. See id. at 310-22.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 101-02.
104. See RESTATEMENT, LAWYERS, supranote 90, ch. 2, Introductory Note, at 124. The clientlawyer relationship is "derived from the law of agency. It concerns a voluntary arrangement in
which an agent, a lawyer, agrees to work for the benefit of a principal, a client." Id.; see also
Deborah A. DeMott, The Lawyer asAgent, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 301,301 (1998).
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First, all agents, not just lawyers, are required to protect
confidentiality. The Restatement of Agency explains the general
principle to be that:
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent ...

[may not] use or ...

communicate information confidentially given him by the principal or
acquired by him during the course of or on account of his agency.., to
the injury of the principal, on his own account or on behalf of another,
although such information does not relate to the transaction in which
he is then employed, unless the information is a matter of general
knowledge.105
Second, the law requires all agents, not just lawyers, to avoid
conflicts of interest:
Unless otherwise agreed, an agency is subject to a duty not to act or
to agree to act during the period of his agency for persons whose
interests conflict with those of the principal in matters in which the
agent is employed.'O6
Third, judgment free of outside temptations and influences is a
general requirement for all agents, whether or not they are members of
the bar.
Not only must an agent not act in the interests of other parties
without the consent of all concerned, but he must not enter into
transactions... the effect of which may give the agent a self-interest in
improperly advising his principal. 0 7
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT,
AGENCY]; see also id. § 388 cmt. c (indicating agent's duty to account for profits made by use of
principal's confidential information). Accountants, for example, also have a duty of confidentiality.
See Roger L. Page, Deloitte & Touche LLP, Remarks to ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice (Mar. 11, 1999), availableat http://www.abanetorg/scriptsiPrintView.asp (last visited Mar.
5, 2002). It is management's duty to disclose audit information publicly, not the auditor's duty. See
id. An auditor may not be a party to fraud any more than a lawyer may, but it is the auditor's refusal
to issue a report or the auditor's withdrawal that sends a signal to the markets, not the auditor's
public disclosure. See id. Lawyers may send the same kind of signal in the form of a "noisy
withdrawal" under MODEL RuLES, supra note 85, R. 1.6 cmts. 15, 17.
Lawyers sometimes cite the attorney-client privilege as an example of their greater duty of
confidentiality. However, that privilege covers far less information than the confidentiality
obligation applicable to lawyers and other agents. Indeed, the privilege is not really a confidentiality
obligation at all; it is a limited immunity from legal compulsion to testify about certain confidential
communications. See RESTATEMENT, LAWYERS, supra note 90, § 68.
106. See RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, supranote 105, § 394; cf RESTATEMENT, LAWYERS, supra
note 90, § 121.
107. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, supra note 105, § 391 cmt. c. This was the sense of
"independent judgment" used by the New York State Bar Commission. See iL In the writing of
others, the concept has at least two other meanings, i.e., independence from client direction and
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Finally, all agents, not just lawyers, must be competent to do the
job for which they are retained.' 8
The first four lawyer "core values," then, simply acknowledge that
lawyers are fiduciaries. They must put their clients' interests ahead of
their own rather than deal with clients at arms length.' 9 Because trustees,
other professionals, and agents generally are held to similar duties,
however, values relating to the relationship with clients cannot justify
giving lawyers a status that carries with it special privileges."0
The three other lawyer "core values"--solving disputes through
advocacy, assuring broad access to legal services, and preserving the
rule of law generally-address benefits that lawyers are said to confer on
society more broadly."' The best-known statement of the "public" role
of the lawyer again comes from Dean Pound:
There is much more in a profession than a traditionally dignified
calling. The term refers to a group of men pursuing a learned art as a
common calling in the spirit of a public service-no less a public
service because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood. Pursuit of
the learned art in the spirit of a. public service is the primary purpose.
Gaining a livelihood2 is incidental, whereas in a business or trade it is
the entire purpose.'

Even the public roles of a lawyer, however, do not justify a unique
"professional" label.
First, many legal issues do not involve advocacy at all. Will
drafting, perfecting a security interest, assuring merchantable title to real
independence from government influence. Those senses of "independence" will be discussed below.
See infra notes 14042 and accompanying text.
108. See RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, supranote 105, § 379 cmt. c.
109. See Crotty, supranote 52, at 179 (citing the autobiography of George Wharton Pepper).
110. See Page, supra note 105 (describing how accountants have similar duties of client
confidentiality to that of lawyers).
111. See N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N, supra note 70, at 310-22.
112. POUND, supra note 9, at 5. Some of Dean Pound's assumptions about how professionals
act sound almost naive today:
[I]f an engineer discovers a new process or invents a new mechanical device he may
obtain a patent and retain for himself a profitable monopoly. If, on the other hand, a
physician discovers a new specific for a disease or a surgeon invents a new surgical
procedure they each publish their discovery or invention to the profession and thus to the
world. If a lawyer has learned something useful to the profession and so to the
administration of justice through research or experience he publishes it in a legal
periodical or expounds it in a paper before a bar association or in a lecture to law
students. It is not his property. He may publish it in a copyrighted book and so have
rights to the literary form in which it is expounded. But the process or method or
developed principle he has worked out belongs to the world.
Id. at 5-6.
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estate, and countless other legal services are used to head off trouble
rather than win a battle. Furthermore, mediation and other forms of less
formal dispute resolution
can often work better without lawyers rather
3
than with them."
Further, effective advocacy is not limited to lawyers. Accountants
vigorously advocate tax positions during audits or even before the Tax
Court, for example."4 Indeed, the lawyers' argument is circular. The
reason we don't see more nonlawyer advocacy is because advocacy has
largely been reserved by law to lawyers.
Finally, it is not at all clear that advocacy is always a virtue.
Lawyers may have a financial incentive to keep people fighting rather
than solving their problems."' Today, much of the caseload in the courts
consists of suits by one corporation that is trying to inflict costs on a
supplier, customer or competitor."6 In an earlier day, we are told,
lawyers did not brag about advocacy."7 Conflict was to be avoided."'
Lawyers saw themselves able to work out differences through
cooperation."9 The suggestion that lawyers are uniquely able to pursue
their clients' interests because they have the only licenses to go to court,
then, is not a sufficient public value on which to rest the legal
profession's claim to special status.
Second, while assuring broad availability of legal services is a
noble core objective of the legal profession, it is unfortunately not a
reality. Indeed, no responsibility to provide free or reduced rate legal
service is imposed on lawyers in any U.S. jurisdiction,' 20 and when the

113. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Limits of Adversarial Ethics, in ETHICS IN
PRACTICE: LAWYERS' ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 123 (Deborah L. Rhode ed.,

2000).
114. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 80, at 187 n.474.
115. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 6, at 123 ("While business leaders raise the most complaints
about legal hypochondria, disputes between businesses are the largest and fastest growing category
of civil litigation.").
116. On the nature of today's litigation and the alleged litigation explosion, see, for example,
Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think
We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentiousand LitigiousSociety, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983); see
also RHODE, supra note 6, at 120-24.
117. See LINOWITz, supra note 4, at 2.
118. See id
119. See id.; see also MICHAEL H. TROTTER, PROFIT AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW: WHAT'S
HAPPENED TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION 127-40 (1997).
120. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supranote 85, R. 6.1.
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ABA Commission considering changes in lawyer obligations recently
took up a proposal to require such service, the proposal was rejected."'
Voluntary legal aid societies around the country certainly deserve
praise for delivering services to the very poor since at least the founding
of the New York Society in 1876.' However, the history of providing
legal services to the poor and middle class often has had almost as much
to do with serving the needs of lawyers as those of clients."'z Concerns
about meeting the legal needs of "persons of moderate means" arose at
the end of World War II as soldiers who had received free legal services
while in the military came home and needed to buy houses, start
businesses, and the like. 4 The expressed concern was about how to meet
their needs. "Lawyer reference plans" (now lawyer referral services)
were one response; legal services offices were another.'21
But an equally large concern was the economic condition of
lawyers documented by Lloyd K. Garrison and the ABA Special
Committee on the Economic Condition of the Bar in 1938.126 In 1939,
then-Solicitor General Robert H. Jackson proposed meeting the needs of
the middle class as the way to get lawyers back on their feet, and he said
it would take a willful effort by a strong bar organization to make that
happen. 27 The bar also tried to limit bar admission and increase
unauthorized practice restrictions.2'
In the context of the time, legal clinics for the poor were seen as a
way to give experience to law students and practical training to young
lawyers who had gone into military service and wanted to get experience
before setting out on their own. 9 Returning lawyer veterans had been
denied G.I. Bill benefits because the government reasoned they were
already trained. 30 Creation of the Legal Services Corporation, indeed,
121.

See COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, ABA, REPORT WITH
TO
THE
HOUSE
OF
DELEGATES
226 (2001), available at

RECOMMENDATION

http:llwww.abanet.orglcpr/e2k-wholejrpt.doc (last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
122. See generally EMERY A. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES (1951)
(comprising part of the Survey of the Legal Profession);JOHN MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, THE LANCE
OF JUSTICE (1928); REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR (1919).

123. See, e.g., LINOWITZ, supra note 4, at 201-06 (stating that law firms often consider pro
bono work good training for young associates).
124. See Reginald Heber Smith, Legal Service Offices for Persons of Moderate Means, 1949
WIs. L. REV. 416, 422-24.
125. See id. at 417-24.
126.

See generally SPECIAL COMM'N, ABA, THE ECONOMICS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION

(1938).
127. See Smith, supranote 124, at 425.
128. See id. at 425-27.
129. See id. at 436.
130. See id. at 437-44.
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was in part a government response to a need that lawyers individually
had refused to assume. 3 ' However lawyers might like to claim the core
value of furthering access to the legal system, then, their basis for doing
so is questionable.
Turning to the final "core value" of preserving the rule of law, it
can be argued that a lawyer's duty to see that clients obey the law is as
great as the duty to protect clients against abuses the legal system can
impose on them. 32 The argument from history is that de Tocqueville and
others saw lawyers as disinterested in and above the fray of commercial
dealings.' 33 The nation's founders, it is said, made some things matters of
law because they did not want them to be the subject of partisan
dispute.""
As one writer puts it:
[T]he ideal of the "independent professional" as public servant haunts
the minds of many American lawyers, not just their academic critics.
The independent professional displays expert judgment while
remaining relatively unspecialized and is thus familiar with the wide
range of legal issues into which his clients' diverse endeavors draw
him. He cultivates collegiality with professional peers without being
diverted from his own life plan. He maintains independence from
clients' interests while retaining and enhancing their business. He
devotes serious attention to pro bono and periodic public service
without enduring economic sacrifice, doing both "good" and "well"
while not striving directly to do either. In this conception of the
lawyer, practitioners are understood as integral components of a
society's legal system who happen to be compensated by private

131. See id. The organized Bar was also concerned that if lawyers did not at least appear to
assume such public responsibilities, the government would "socialize" the profession:
For selfish and unselfish reasons we hope that the new world will be attracted by our
form of government and the American way of life so that, in other nations, free peoples
will set up democratic regimes and institutions.
In order that our general system may make its maximum appeal, and because we are
not hypocrites, we are engaged in reexamining our own institutions. We want to keep
what is good, and add what is found needed.
Law is the foundation of our whole structure. We are determined that it shall be
strong. We know that law is not self-enforcing, and that lawyers are essential.
Id. at 444.
132. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1,
4-5 (1988).
133. See id. at 14-15.
134. See, e.g., PAUL G. HASKELL, WHY LAWYERS BEHAVE AS THEY Do 85-92 (1998);
LiNowrrZ, supra note 4, at 4, 9-18 (stating that the rule of law is diminished when lawyers see their
role as helping clients get what they want, rather than what they are entitled to).
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payment, not as part of the market for human services whose services
happen to involve interactions with the legal system.' 3

The first problem with such a view of lawyers, of course, is that
lawyers cannot truly be independent of their clients. Quite apart from
their status as fiduciaries who are legally required to pursue the interests
of clients, people do not retain a lawyer to preserve the rule of law; they
retain a lawyer to get a useful service. 3 6 As one lawyer has explained:
"We only exist because of the client. Without the client there's no
need to have a lawyer! And we exist to solve people's problems. So if
you're the type of person who doesn't want37to solve somebody else's
problem, you should not be practicing law."'

Indeed, historians record that lawyers have been assisting
participants in corporate affairs at least as long as there have been
corporations.'3 8 Lawyers were long one of the few educated groups in
society. 39 Entrepreneurs sought lawyers out for introductions into the
corridors of power and money. 40 Indeed, lawyer creativity in helping
business executives go beyond what the law seemed to permit has
arguably been one of the things that
has made U.S. economic
4
development as dynamic as it has been.' 1
What observers like to think happened is that lawyers also
restrained the excesses in which corporate officials would have
engaged,44 and legend says that this restraint was exercised with a view
to the public interest. 43 Elihu Root is quoted as saying, for example, that
135. Mark J. Osiel, Lawyers as Monopolists, Aristocrats, and Entrepreneurs, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 2009, 2014 (1990) (book review) (footnote omitted).
136. For one attempt to describe the value added by lawyers, see generally Ronald J. Gilson,
Value Creationby Business Lawyers: Legal Skills andAsset Pricing,94 YALE LJ.239 (1984). "
137. CARROLL SERON, THE BUSINESS OF PRACTICING LAW: THE WORK LIVES OF SOLO AND
SMALL-FIRM ATTORNEYS 106 (1996) (quoting attomey Vincent Federici).
138. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860,
at 110-14 (1977).
139. As business people are themselves well educated and connected, the lawyer has become
more valued for information than counsel and advice. See MACKLIN FLEMING, LAWYERS, MONEY,
AND SUCCESS: THE CONSEQUENCES OF DOLLAR OBSESSION 3-6,47-54 (1997).
140. See id.
141. See HORWITZ, supranote 138, at 140-59.
142. In the old days, relationships with clients and within firms were more like family. See
LINOWITZ, supra note 4, at 30-32. Now the pursuit of money has arguably replaced all that. See id.
Law practice has become more competitive and lawyers more personally insecure. See TROTrER,
supra note 119, at 194-96. Indeed, now, it is probably in the interest of corporate counsel to keep
lawyers uncertain about what work will be coming their way. See generally MARK STEVENS,
POWER OF ATTORNEY: THE RISE OFTHE GIANT LAW FIRMS 17-36 (1987).
143. There certainly was rhetoric to that effect at the time the ABA first prepared its Canons of
Ethics in 1908. See generally Carle, supra note 32; Pearce, supranote 32.
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"'half the practice of a decent lawyer consists in telling would-be clients
that they are damned fools and should stop."" 44 However, even
statements like Root's provide no evidence that clients took such advice
from lawyers. All that we really know about lawyers' preserving the rule
of law and assuring client compliance with it, then, comes from lawyers'
claims. Their reliability is hardly a basis for granting lawyers unique
professional status.
C. The Realistic Future of Lawyering
It seems inescapable to conclude that lawyers today are simply
some persons among many who would like to provide services to
clients. To the extent those services have value, the lawyers will be
retained. To the extent someone else provides services of more value,
the clients will turn elsewhere. 4 1 If clients want to hire lawyers or others
as employees to give them advice on any subject, they can do that too.
Clients can hire specialists in particular fields when they need them, and
take or leave their advice as they wish. As discussed earlier, lawyers'
efforts to limit whom the clients are free to consult, are likely doomed to
fail.
That is not to say lawyers are doomed to oblivion. Many provide
services that clients find valuable. Basically, lawyers are able to research
the state of the law on particular issues. They are creative verbally and
able to marshal facts and precedent in an effort to influence sources of
power, i.e., courts, legislatures, and others. They help solve problems
and help clients make things happen within parameters permitted
by law.' 46
The significant breakthrough that created modem businesses was
the ability to deliver a standard product at a lower price and better
quality than consumers could buy before. 47 The same is true of
successful law firms. In those firms, experienced people get together
who have done a type of task many times before and who can deliver
high quality services to their clients.'"
144. 1 PHILIP C. JESSUP, ELImu ROOT 133 (1938) (quoting Elihu Root).
145. For a recent attempt to describe the evolving world in which lawyers work, see generally
The Scale of Justice: Observations on the Transformation of Urban Lav
John P. Heinz et al.,
Practice,27 ANN. REv. SOC. 337 (2001).
146. See, e.g., FLEMING, supranote 139, at 3-6, 47-54.
147. See POSNER, supranote 20, at 47.
148. See FLEMING, supra note 139, at 3-6. That principle is arguably less true when unique
litigation or other services are involved. Then, businesses may find themselves charged premium
hourly rates even when the law firm is no better than other lawyers doing such a task for the
first time.
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Judge Richard Posner observes:
Something like the evolution of the textile industry from guild
production to mass production, and the concomitant decline
of
49
artisanality, is occurring today in the market for legal services.
Technical and organizational innovations have increased the vigor
of competition in the legal-services market, but they have also an
independent significance for the transformation of the profession. The
rise of the paralegal has demonstrated that much of the traditional work
of lawyers can be done by nonlawyers. It has also made the production
of legal services a less homogeneous activity.5
Even the ABA has now recognized that law firms may find it
helpful to offer nonlegal services that are "ancillary" to their regular
legal practice to help meet recurring client needs. 5' It is hard, then, to
find a principled basis to prevent others from hiring the same lawyers to
provide their regular services through a multidisciplinary organization.
Whatever the form of the entities in which lawyers practice,
however, the effect of competition on clients will have an inevitable
impact on their lawyers. Efficient delivery of services will be essential
and will put pressure on lawyer fees. 52 Whether or not lawyers bill by
the hour, lawyers are likely to continue to feel overworked and to burn
out more quickly than in earlier years. 53 Firms may have to return to the
days of low associate-partner ratios so that more client work is done by

Another factor leading to the development and growth of law firms was that the rise of
regulation made it impossible for a single lawyer to handle all the problems of a client. Thus, law
firms serving clients had to develop pools of lawyers with varying specialties to bring to bear on a
client's problems. See generally LINOWTZ, supra note 4, at 69-112.
149. POSNER, supra note 20, at 47.
150. Id. at 66.
151. See MODEL RULES, supra note 85, R. 5.7.
152. See LINowrrz, supra note 4, at 167-84. There may be pressure for more use of Alternate
Dispute Resolution, although to the extent litigation is being employed to delay payment or impose
other costs on an opponent, only one side is likely to want to reduce those costs. On the other hand,
lawyers may have to change the methods by which law suits are financed. That will be likely to
reduce lawyer control of litigation but put control in the hands of people who can control costs. See
FLEMING, supranote 139, at 129-38.
153. See TROTTER, supra note 119, at 81-92, 100-26; see also PAUL M. BARRETr, THE GOOD
BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA (1999). Barrett's work is the story of Lawrence
Mungin, a lawyer chewed up by the present system, but more generally an account of the
depersonalization of modem practice from the perspective of a young lawyer. Mungin had been
successful at two previous firms but then joined a third to work for a large rainmaker. See id. at
9-13. The practice that the rainmaker anticipated never developed, and the firm did a terrible job of
helping Mungin work into the firm's practice some other way. See id. at 113-30.
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lawyers with experience, even if that cuts the short-term profitability of
those firms.' 4
To meet competitive pressures that clients will impose, law firms
may have to cut back on office overhead, but other demands from clients
may greatly increase the costs that law firms face. Some clients want to
deal with law firms electronically, for example, a demand that does not
5
allow the firms to defer the cost of becoming technologically literate. 1
On another front, competition for lawyer talent is likely to require firms
balance between time spent at the office,
to establish a more realistic
56
money, and lifestyle.1
Some fear that without the leadership of professional organizations
and the insulation from competition provided by professional rules, the
morality of lawyers' conduct will decline. 5 7 However, individual
lawyers, not their professions or other groups, must ultimately be the
moral actors. Lawyers exercise moral authority by deciding which cases
to take, which to decline, and by deciding how to act in their cases.151
Professional rules will never be enough to assure professional conduct;
guidance to lawyers
however, they may provide much helpful
59
predisposed to act properly in the first place.
An often greater pressure on lawyers today is the fact that they must
act as members of teams rather than as individual moral agents.' 6 That

154. See, e.g., TROTTER, supranote 119, at 141-56.
155. See, e.g., RICHARD SUSsKIND, THE FUTURE OF LAW: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 3 (1996); RICHARD SUSSKIND, TRANSFORMING THE LAW: ESSAYS ON
TECHNOLOGY, JUSTICE AND THE LEGAL MARKETPLACE 4 (2000).
156. Law firms are going to have to give real client responsibility to young lawyers sooner in
order both to train them and to keep them involved with the firm. See FLEMING, supranote 139, at
92-96, 113-27. It costs a firm $200,000 to replace a second year associate, and close to half the
associates at the average firm leave before they have been there four years. It may be much more
profitable for firms to treat associates better from the outset rather than assuming pay will overcome
all other issues. Giving associates the chance to work out an acceptable mix of pay and leisure may
let them stay at the firm and improve the bottom line. See, e.g., Joan Williams & Cynthia Thomas
Calvert, Don't Go! We Can Change, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 5, 2001, at 20; see also Terry Carter, Your
Tine or Your Money, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2001, at 26, 26-27.
157. See, e.g., Carl M. Selinger, The Public's Interest in Preserving the Dignity and Unity of
the Legal Profession,32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 861, 869-72 (1997).
158. See, e.g., HASKELL, supra note 134, at 85-92; John J. Flynn, ProfessionalEthics and the
Lawyer's Duty to Self, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 429,429-32.
159. See LINOWITZ, supra note 4, at 4, 9-18 (stating that the rule of law is diminished when
lawyers see their role as to help clients get what they want, rather than what they are entitled to); see
also FLEMING, supra note 139, at 105-12 (arguing that firms must find ways to improve their
"integrity control," i.e., preventing billing fraud and avoiding being retained by dishonest clients,
not just "quality control" in delivery of services).
160. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, A Tale of FourSystems: Reflections on How Law Influences the
"EthicalInfrastructure"of Law Firms, 39 S.TEx. L. REV. 245, 246 (1997) (noting that "the quality
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reality and hence that pressure to conform seems likely only to increase,
and the consequent sense of personal insignificance may magnify the
challenge of getting lawyers to resist improper conduct. Indeed, lawyers
may disagree among themselves about what is morally required in a
given situation. 6 ' Even now, law firms and other practice organizations
establish standards for their own lawyers
and designate persons within
62
those firms to whom lawyers may turn.1
D. Revising the Meaning of Professionalism
Much of the concern expressed in this Article is familiar to those
who have thought about professions and professionalism, 63 but it is hard
to abandon concepts that have become such a part of lawyers' selfimage. Thus, some have proposed to transform or redefine the concept
of professionalism into something more meaningful to at least some
lawyers.'
First, sociologist Terrence Halliday suggests that the legal
profession be seen as a way for lawyers to provide themselves an
"intermediate" institution in an otherwise fragmented world.'6 We all
need such institutions, he suggests. 66 Government is too distant and
impersonal, the argument goes; other institutions are needed to help
people work together effectively.' 67 The legal profession might be
transformed into something important to lawyers in that process.
That is certainly a possible role for professional organizations. Bar
associations today act as centers for networking, for example, as
providers of continuing legal education, and as sources of informed

and probity of a lawyer's work may depend crucially on the 'ethical infrastructure' or internal
controls" deployed in the workplace).
161. See, e.g., BANKS McDOWELL, ETHICAL CONDUCT AND THE PROFESSIONAL'S DILEMMA
20-21 (1991).
162. Cf.N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(E) (2001) (requiring law firms to
keep records of attorneys cases to reduce risk of client conflict).
163. See, e.g., Nancy J. Moore, ProfessionalismReconsidered, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
773, 773; Terrell & Wildman, supra note 15, at 403.
164. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 163, at 774 (noting that many bar associations are
encouraging pro bono work as "one way to let the public know that we are a profession," as well as
encouraging other activities).
165. See TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY 16-24 (1987) (citing Durkheim for this
idea in France and Magali Larson in the United States).
166. See id. at 18, 21.
167. See id. at 17-18, 21.
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judgment about legal issues for legislatures, courts and agencies.', But
to any individual lawyer, a profession of a million-plus lawyers is far too
large to be a intermediate institution in any realistic sense. Even in the
roughly 400,000 member ABA,' 69 most active ABA members tend to
work through sections or section committees that are typically
smaller still."O
The legal profession, then, is not itself a useful intermediate
institution, and a sense of professional identity is not essential to a given
lawyer's sense of personal identity. Indeed, it may be that in many cases
law firms have replaced bar associations as the principal intermediate
institutions for their members. Firm culture more directly affects lawyer
7
behavior,1
' and firms can compete for the reputation to which they will
72
aspire.
Second, Professor Deborah Rhode acknowledges lawyers' lack of
commitment to many of their core professional values but calls for a
renewal of that commitment. In particular, she calls for a "culture of
commitment" to making legal services available to all through broad
provision of pro bono service.'73
It is possible that this kind of appeal to professional tradition will
have more effect in the future than it has had in the past, but it is hard to
see why. However justified in the abstract such appeals may seem, the
pressures of modem practice seem likely to reduce their persuasiveness
unless lawyers and firms see the service as consistent with their own
interests.
And that may happen. Skadden Arps generated enormous good will
for itself by creating the Skadden Fellowships for public interest
168. For example, the ABA offers continuing legal education programs and information about
the law designed to aid lawyers with their work. See About the ABA, ABA Network, at
http:llwww.abanet.orglabouLhome.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2002).
169. At the end of the 2000-2001 association year, membership in the ABA reached a record
high with 408,685 members. Of these, only 315,197 were lawyers; the rest were law students and
nonlawyers. See Robert A. Stein, Membership at an All-Time High, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2001, at 66,
66-67.
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., Schneyer, supranote 160, at 246,252-53.
172. Professor Richard Painter speculates that firms may even realize a competitive advantage
by developing a reputation for ethical conduct. See Richard NV.Painter, Toward a Market for
Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search of Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
221,224 (1995); see also Larry E. Ribstein, EthicalRules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure,
84 VA. L. REv. 1707, 1707 (1998). See generally Peter C. Kostant, Paradigm Regained: How
Competitionfrom Accounting FirmsMay Help CorporateAttorneys to Recapture the EthicalHigh
Ground,20 PACE L. REv. 43 (1999).
173. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono for Lawyers and
Law Students, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE, supranote 113, at 264.
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practice, for example.' 74 Other firms see pro bono work as good training
for lawyers and law firms may accept responsibility for such service as a
way to attract lawyers as well as build a reputation for community
service. 7 1 Professor Rhode is not wrong to call for pro bono service, but
the concept of "professionalism" seems likely to be neither necessary
nor particularly helpful in realizing that objective.
Third, Professors Robert Gordon and William Simon see
professionalism as a concept to be "redeemed"' 76 in ways that fit their
own ideals. Each has previously argued that lawyers should maintain a
critical independence from their clients' values, an independence
facilitated by the sense that lawyers as professionals are inherently
different from other kinds of advisers.'" As they recognize, such a call
for a radical departure from client values is unlikely to come out of a
traditional bar association, so they posit smaller organizations to "give
collegial support to members in developing their own conceptions of
responsible practice."'7 If calling their ideas "professional" enhances
formation of such support groups, the term should certainly be used. I
simply believe that law firms or voluntary organizations of like-minded
lawyers are even more promising settings for such collegial support.
V.

CONCLUSION

It seems clear even from the work of Gordon, Simon, Halliday and
Rhode that we are now a long way from the grandiose claims of Roscoe
Pound, Reginald Heber Smith and others behind the Survey of the Legal
Profession. Organized professionalism in the sense developed by the
ABA in the first half of the twentieth century is-and should be seen
as-dead.
Ignoble as it may sound, lawyers today are not guardians of the law.
They are not legislators; they are not judges. They may become either or
both, but until they do, they are just citizens. They should have respect
for law and legal institutions, but so should everyone else.
174.

See LINCOLN CAPLAN, SKADDEN: POWER, MONEY, AND THE RISE OF A LEGAL EMPIRE

191-206 (1993).
175. See LINOWITZ, supranote 4, at 201-06. Indeed, it is said that European countries that have
broken down the professionalism protection of the bar have done more to restore the public role of
lawyers than the more cautious approach in this country. See Osiel, supra note 135, at 2047-48.
176. Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in
LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES, supranote 11, at 230, 230.
177. See William H. Simon, EthicalDiscretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 108384 (1988); Robert W. Gordon, CorporateLaw Practiceas a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REV. 255,
258 (1990); Gordon, supra note 132, at 6.
178. See Gordon & Simon, supranote 176, at 244.
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If I am right, bar associations will and should continue to evolve
into trade associations, not governors of an organized profession. There
is nothing inherently wrong with trade associations; among other things,
they can provide continuing education, occasions to socialize informally,
and vehicles for lobbying. But they should be understood to be no more
than what they are. The Bush Administration's removal of the ABA's
special authority to review federal judicial candidates in advance of their
nomination, 79 for example, may have been self-defeating as a matter of
politics, but it was right as a matter of principle.8 Lawyers can and do
have opinions about judicial candidates, but their status as professionals
should give them no formal role in judicial nominations.'
Abandoning organized professionalism will not be easy. Lawyers
tend to look backward, and bar leaders who have been financially
successful under the current system have little incentive to face squarely
the world as it is likely to become.
The same problem confronts legal education. Students are too often
taught problems of the past while they prepare to live in the future." 2
Professor Chafee observed that law students in 1900 were largely
unprepared for the legal revolutions of the twentieth century, i.e.,
workers' compensation, income taxes, labor relations, and the growth of
administrative agencies. 3 It is perhaps no accident that, as lawyers, they
were often among those most resisting such changes."
Law schools will have to become competitive. They will have to
prepare students for what the students see they must become, whether or
not that is a practicing lawyer as that term has been heretofore
understood. This will create problems for those who believe law schools
exist primarily to acculturate students into professional values,'5 but it is
likely to lead ultimately to better service to their clients. 6
179. See Amy Goldstein, ABA Weighs In On President'sCourt Nominees, WASH. POST., June
27, 2001, at A23.
180. The additional time required for ABA review can be used to delay Senate consideration of
the nominees.
181. The authority had originally been granted in 1952, in the midst of the Survey of the Legal
Profession, as exemplifying lawyers' central role in the administration of justice. See Ramo &
Cooper, supra note 63, at 97 n.17.
182. See Chafee, supranote 49, at 46-53.
183. See id.
184. Seeid.at46.
185. See generally MACCRATE COMM'N, supranote 7 (identifying skills and values deemed to
be essential for every lawyer). Dean Wigmore, in his Introduction to CARTER, supra note 6, said
eloquently:
[I]f [the law] is thus set apart as a profession, it must have traditions and tenets of its
own, which are to be mastered and lived up to. This living spirit of the profession, which
limits yet uplifts it as a livelihood, has been customarily known by the vague term Legal
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Looking back at the efforts to achieve organized professionalism,
one must of course acknowledge that much more was involved than the
conscious rationalizations of members of a cartel. Efforts to improve the
law's fairness, to eliminate invidious discrimination, and to enhance
opportunities for all our citizens have occupied the public careers of
many of the nation's finest lawyers, often at real cost to themselves. We
all benefit from the uniform laws, simplified procedures, and important
reforms that they have to show for their work, and nothing in this Article
is meant to show disrespect for those efforts or suggest that such work
should end.
On the other hand, if lawyers cannot divorce those efforts from
resistance to changes in practice that clients require, lawyers will hurt
those clients but especially hurt themselves. The rhetoric of organized
professionalism has outlived whatever usefulness it had. Certainly, the
understanding of professionalism as requiring strong central
organization and restrictive rules of practice should now and forever be
abandoned.

Ethics. There is much more to it than rules of Ethics. There is a whole atmosphere of
life's behavior. What is signified is all the learning about the traditions of behavior that
mark off and emphasize the legal profession as a guild of public officers. And the
apprentice must hope and expect to make full acquaintance with this body of traditions,
as his manual of equipment, without which he cannot do his part to keep the law on the
level of a profession.
Id. at xxiv.
186. In Judge Posner's words:
The homogeneity of professional training [today] produces a degree of consensus on
professional issues that tricks the practitioners into believing they have a pipeline to the
truth. The complexity of law's doctrines, the obscurity of its jargon, and the objectifying
of "the law" are in part endogenous to the organization of the legal profession, rather
than being exogenous factors to which the profession has adapted.
POSNER, supra note 20, at 58; see also Russell G. Pearce, The ProfessionalismParadigmShift: Why
DiscardingProfessionalIdeology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1229, 1230 (1995).
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